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SEPARATION OF POWERS REVISITED

hs

MEANING TO ADMINISTRATIVE LAw

Reginald Parker*

I
PREFACE

S

INCE administrative law is law that governs, and is applied by,
the executive branch of government/ it is necessarily as old as
that branch. As long as executive and judiciary were one and the same
and the king at the head of both,2 all of the law was in fact "administrative"3 though the term was not used. 4 When, however, out of the
amorphous mass of the legal order a :fixed body of law courts began to
emerge with jurisdiction over the most important legal problems, the
term "administrative law," had it been used, would have acquired a
specific meaning. Property, torts, contracts, and crimes belonged to the
courts,5 but the execution of law such as Henry VIII's Statute of Sewers,6 the care for the poor, the king's household and revenues, and like
matters were left to what we now call the executive. Its province, more* Visiting Professor of Law, University of Arkansas.-Ed.
Frankfurter, ''The Task of Administrative Law," 75 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 614 at 615
(1927); KELsBN, GENERAL THEORY oP LAw AND STATE 274 (1945); CARROW, THE BACKGROUND OP AnMINISTRATIVI! LAw 25-26 (1948); Parker, "Administrative Law in Arkansas,'' 4 .Amt. L. REv. 107 (1950).
2 Any separation of powers was "alien to English political life until the time of Anne,"
i.e., until the first decade of the 18th century. Landis, "Statutes and the Sources of Law"
in HARVARD LEGAL EssAYS 215 (1934). And see below, note 12. No separation of powers
other than mere factual divisions of labor existed prior to that time anywhere, particularly
not in the Antiquity. Parker, "Judiciary and Executive Branch of Government," 9 THE
JURIST 205 at 206-209 (1949). And see below, at notes 14-24.
3 Apart from the major works on English legal history (such as Pollock and Maitland,
Holdsworth, and Plucknett), reference is made to RADIN, HANDBOOK OP ANGLO-AMERICAN
LEGAL HISTORY (1936) for a fuller understanding of the history and early function of
courts. See also the same author's remarkable survey of administrative law in his THE LAW
AND You 159-164 (1948).
4 In this country, "Administrative Law" was not considered worthy of being a separate
syllabus heading in the NATIONAL REPORTER SYSTEM until 1947 or a subject in AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE until 1942, when it was called "Public Administrative Law,'' obviously for the purpose of giving it a place in the then appearing volume no. 42. Nor has
CoRPus JURis SEcUNDUM yet an article on this title; but perhaps its editors, too, are going
to repent in some subsequent volume. Yet the word "administrative law" is not altogether
new in American usage. See, e.g., 6 Qp. Am. GEN. 99 (1853) ("•.. the administrative
law of the United States••••").
5 Domestic relations not yet, inasmuch as these and related matters were tried in ecclesiastic courts. RADIN, HANDBOOK OP ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HisTORY 98-109 (1936).
6 23 Henry VIII, c. 5 (1531) (providing for commissions to make inquiries and punish
those that cause annoyance, etc.).
1
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over, included affairs that have often been understated as not falling
within the province of lawmaking and applying at all, such as the conduct of foreign or military affairs, the carrying on of wars, etc. Certainly the reception or expulsion of a foreign ambassador by the chief
of state is the application of that law, international and domestic, that
sets forth in what manner foreign envoys are to be dealt with and by
whom; to say that the king "can" make war and deal with his soldiers
as he sees fit is another way of saying he may do so by virtue of whatever written or unwritten constitution the country in question has. But
while we now recognize that anything the state does is the making and
applying of law7 -regardless of whether it is called bad, tyrannical, dictatqrial, progressive, totalitarian or democratic law, depending on the
critic's W eltanschauung-there can be no doubt that, from a lawyer's
point of view, there is a world of difference (gradual though it may be)
between, say, a court deciding a dispute concerning title to real property and a king making one of his courtiers ambassador to a foreign
country or commander-in-chief of the army. In the former instance,
an intricate, detailed set of narrow rules and exceptions must be studied
before the law-applier can reach a decision, which is therefore a typical
lawyer's task. In the latter instance, however, the law that is to be
applied is a simple, broad rule8 leaving so wide a discretion to the lawapplier that for his office he may need to have foresight, education and
experience9 but not necessarily legal training. Bluntly speaking, the
discretion here is so wide that its connection with law is barely recognizable.10 The conduct of foreign or military matters was thus easily
7 KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE (1945); BENTHAM, THE LIMITS OF
JURISPRUDENCE DEFINED, Everett ed., 90, 108, 109 (1945). See also this writer's review,
41 !LL. L. REv. 145 (1946).
8 Which might be restated as "Whenever there is a vacancy among the king's ambassadors, or generals, the king may in his discretion appoint to the post whomever he finds
to be suitable." The king's discretion was in fact limited merely by custom and etiquette.
9 At least if one believes in the soundness of Aristotle's holding that "if people desire
to understand politics they need experience as well as theory." NmoMACHEAN ETHics 1181a.
10 The idea that some problems, though actually presented by the legal order, such as
the constitutionality of a given voting system, are not truly ''legal" and hence may not be
decided by the Court in view of their "political" nature has played an important role in the
philosophy of the Supreme Court to this day. South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276, 70 S.Ct. 641
(1950); Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 66 S.Ct. 1198 (1946), 41 ILL. L. REv. 578
(1946); Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 at 302, 38 S.Ct. 309 (1918) (question who is the sovereign of a country political); Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202 at
212, 11 S.Ct. 80 (1890) (same); Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. (27 U.S.) 253 (1829) (question
whether region belongs to U.S. or Spain political); Pacific Telephone Co. v. Oregon, 223
U.S. 118 at 133, 32 S.Ct. 224 (1912) (question of state's republican form of government
political). And see CoRWrN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND PoWERS, 3d ed., 214-216 (1948);
Parker, ''Executive and Judiciary Branch of Government,'' 9 THE JURIST 205 at 218-31
(1949); Field, ''The Doctrine of Political Questions in the Federal Courts,'' 8 MINN. L.
REv. 485 (1924). And see below note 68.
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separated, as a "roya1 prerogative,
o
e making of"l aw"in the narrower sense of the word11 -which at least in English history
was eventually left to Parliament alone, and its execution, which was
done by the courts and only in relatively unimportant instances left to
other organs.12 In other words, in advanced society there exists a division of labor between the various organs of state--king, legislature,
courts, commissions-in that some make and apply rules of "law" in
the popular, limited meaning of the term, whereas others, notably the
king, are confined to problems whose solution allows a wide latitude of
discretion-a type of action that in later years has often been denominated as "policy making." In the course of further events and of theoretical analyses, the relation between discretion and royal power gradually turned into a causal one: the king has certain powers because
they are discretionary, because they "involve no law." This has been
further simplified to the statement that power involving wide discretion, or "policy," is executive rather than judicial.

II
HrsToRic OuTLINE

Enthusiasts of the separation doctrine13 have attempted to. trace it
back to Antiquity. The first of its prophets is said to be the inevitable
Aristotle. 14 Nothing could be farther fetched. Aristotle merely men11 That is, general norms addressed to an indefinite number of persons, as distinguished
from law in the broader sense meaning every binding norm including special norms or
individual decisions.
12 E.g., above, note 6. Nominally, the king is still the "fountainhead of justice," but
actually English judges had become independent of the crown by statutes that made them
irremovable, except for misconduct and upon impeachment by Parliament. 13 W. III, c. 2
(1701) and 1 Geo. ill, c. 23 (1760); 1 BLACKST. CoMM. 267; Parker, "Judiciary and Executive Branch of Government," 9 THE Joru:sT 205 at 215 (1949). The development that
rendered the judiciary more or less independent of the chief of state can be observed
everywhere, even in totalitarian states. The main difference, however, between the latter
and those following the British pattern lies in the fact that in the police state, old as well
as new, the courts' jurisdiction is strictly limited to a few fields, whereas the executive enjoys
power over many important matters, such as administrative detentions in camps. Cf. Hazard,
"Soviet Socialism and Due Process of Law," 48 MrCH. L. REv. 1061 (1950).
13 Even today it can be heard that the doctrine is "probably our chief contribution to
the science of government. ••• No theatre of the American system has excited greater admiration." Ohio v. Fulton, 99 Ohio 168, 124 N.E. 172 at 177 (1919). And see Kilbourn v.
Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 at 190 (1880); Friedrich, "Separation of Powers," 13 ENCYc.
Soc. Ser. 663 (1934); MUNRO, THE GOVERNMENT OP THE ilNITI!D STATES, 5th ed., 57
(1946). Nicholas Murray Butler, "Die republikanische Staatsform," pp. 5-6 (address to the
Austrian Parliament, June 22, 1931), described the separation of powers as "the foremost
particularity" of the American Constitution, "invented by Aristotle, taught by Montesquieu,
and regarded as the most important thing by founders of the American Constitution."
14 See, e.g., Butler, above, note 13; Fairlie, "Th~ Separation of Powers," 21 M:rCH. L.
REv. 393 (1921).
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tions15 without further analysis that "every good constitution" has three
elements, the first of which is an organ that not only deliberates commonwealth matters,1 6 but is also the supreme authority of the constitution in regard to war and peace, foreign alliances, death sentences, exile,
property confiscation, and the accounts of the magistrates. The second
organ is the judiciary,17 whose criminal and civil jurisdiction is listed,
whereas the proposed function of the third one, the magistrates,1 8 is
not indicated. There is nothing to suggest a "separation" between the
three governmental organs. Nor did the actual Greek constitutions, or
that of Rome. Polybius,1 9 who, like others before and after him, distinguishes between three kinds20 of constitutions (monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy), finds that the Roman constitution has elements of every one of them: The popular assemblies confer honors and
inflict punishment;21 the consuls control the military; and-seemingly
most important to Polybius-the senate controls matters of revenue and
expenditure as well as supplies for the army, decides whether a consul
remains a general after his term expired, and decrees or denies a formal
triumph. He finds this constitution most perfect, because of the counteraction and co-operation22 of one branch with the other. There was,
indeed, a system of checks and balances, as well as mutual distrust and
confusion between various supreme organs of the Roman state, but not
between the executive and judiciary.23
Medieval and early modern thinkers have been mentioned as forerunners of the separation idea.24 Yet even Hooker demanded no more
than that the sovereign, who is to be the maker of both mundane and
15 PoLITics 1297£-BOOb. See also CAIRNS, LEGAL PmLOSOPHY FROM PLATO TO HEGEL
77-126 (1949).
16 To BouAiw6µevov irEpi T&v Ko1v&v.
17 To 61K6:l;ov.
18 To irEpi Tac;; apxo:c;;.
19 HisToRIEs vi, 3, 11-18. Polybius, too, is frequently mentioned as a supporter of the
separation doctrine. Cf., e.g., Fairlie, "The Separation of Powers," 21 MICH. L. RBv. 393
(1921).
I
2 0 To what extent ancient beliefs in the sacredness of the figure 3 have influenced political
thinkers of the past need not be investigated here. Cf. KnoEBER, ANTHROPOLOGY 252 (1923).
2 1 How entirely inapposite it is to quote those antique writers (or, as in the case of
Polybius, panegyrists) for modern comparisons is best demonstrated by the fact that Polybius
does not even mention the lawmaking power of the popular assemblies!
22 'AvTl'rrp6:TIE1v 8oUATJ8EVTO: Ka:i auvEpyEiv 6:AATJA01c;;. Ibid. VI. 15.
28 A more accurate picture of the constitution of Rome can be gleaned from CoWELL,
CxcERo .AND THE RoMAN REPUBLIC (1948). And see this writer's review, 59 YALB L. J.
184 (1949).
24 Notably Marsilius of Padua, _Thomas Aquinas, and Richard Hooker. Cf. Fairlie,
"Separation of Powers,'' 21 MicH. L. RBv. 393 at 394 (1921). And see, as to Hooker,
GETTELL, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT 197 (1924); BURGESS, lNrnoDUCTION TO
PmLosoPHY 534 (1938).

I.
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ecclesiastic law as well as the supreme judge, be limited in his power
by the "natural" law. Hooker, it is true, ushered in the modem concept
of natural law2 5 and expounded the social-contract theory,26 and is
therefore of fundamental importance for those later writers, notably
Locke, who proposed political theories in order to curb the sovereign.
Yet it cannot be maintained that he wanted the sovereign, who makes
all the laws, including those of the church, and who exercises the judicial power, to be limited in his power except, of course, through the
"natural law" itself.27
Separation of powers can be comprehended only as the outcome of
the struggle of the British Parliament with the crown. Its theory embodies the victory of the former. 28 After the Glorious Revolution, the
king seldom interfered with acts of Parliament. Since 1707 he has no
longer withheld royal assent from legislative bills. 29 Likewise has he
for some time abstained from intruding in the sphere of the courts:
Equity is no longer the king's prerogative exercised to develop new law
or indeed to counteract the law courts, but rather a system of courts, a
branch of the independent judiciary with which the king must not
meddle.80 He is now subject to the "law," that is, to the law as interpreted by the courts. It is probably true that this development "has
merely substituted the judge's prejudice for the king's." 81 Yet it is one
of the pillars on which rest modem constitutional and administrative
law. The others are the writings of Locke and Montesquieu.
John Locke's Two Treatises of Government appeared in 1690.
Their purpose was, in short, to formulate for the recently restored
monarchy a working political theory that should show the desirability
251 HooKER, OF THE LAWES OF EccLEsIASTICALL PounE, first published in 1594;
DAVIS, THE PoLITicAL IDEAS OF RrcHARD HOOKER 44-61 (1946).
26 l HooKER, ii, iii, x, xvi; Barnes, "Social Thought in Early Modem Man" in AN
lN:rnonacnoN TO THE HISTORY OF SoCIOLOGY, Barnes ed., 30-31 (1948). Hooker's pactum
subiectionis, however, was used in support of absolutism (enlightened by natural law) and
not in the revolutionary sense of Locke or particularly Rousseau. DAVIS, THE PoLITICAL
IDEAS oF R:rCHARD HooKER 77 (1946).
21 8 HooKER i, ii, vi.
28 Friedrich, "Separation of Powers," 13 ENCYC. Soc. Ser. 663 (1934).
20 Yet to this day every Act of Parliament is published with the fictitious promulgation
"Le Roy le veult." l BucxsT. CoMM. 184; 4 STEPHEN, NEw COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAws OF ENGLAND, 15th ed., Jenks, 324-25 (1908); 6 HAr.sBURY, LAWS OF ENGLAND, 2d
ed., Hailsham, 463-64 (1932 ff.); ScawARZ, DEs ENGLISCHE REcHT UND SErNE QUEI.LEN
43 (1931).
so Above, note 12. On the development of equity and its becoming "equity jurisprudence," i.e., a part of the judiciary system, see RADIN, HANDBOOK OF ANGLO-AMERICAN
LEGAL HISTORY 422 ff. (1936). The chief executive's right to pardon convicted criminals
is the main remnant of the king's position as the supreme dispenser of justice.
s1 RassELL, A HisTORY oF WESTERN PmLosoPHY 639 (1945).
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of a monarchy with limited powers.32 In the Second Treatise Locke
distinguishes between the legislative and executive power of a good
commonwealth, whereby "the legislative and executive power come
often to be separated,"33 which is in accordance with his desire. 34 Aside
from the executive power, which is concerned with things depending
on national law, there is yet another one, viz., the federative power,
which "contains the power of war and peace, leagues and alliances, and
all the transactions with all persons and communities without the commonwealth," in other words, military and foreign affairs. 35 The federative power, albeit very important for the commonwealth, "is much
less capable to be directed by antecedent, standing, positive laws than
the executive, and so must necessarily be left to the prudence and wisdom" of its bearer.36 Yet, despite this difference, both executive and
federative power "are always almost united," a situation with which
Locke agrees, "for both of them requiring the force of society for their
exercise, it is almost impracticable ... that the executive and federative.
power should be placed in persons that might act separately, whereby
the force of the public would be under different commands ...."37 To
these powers Locke makes an important addition, inasmuch as "several
things should be left to the discretion of him that has the executive
power" when the legislature is not assembled as well as in regard to
things "which the law can by no means provide for" and which "must
necessarily be left to the discretion of him that has the executive power,
to be ordered by him as the public good and advantage shall require;
nay; it is fit that the laws themselves should in some cases give way to
the executive power...."38 "This power to act according to discretion
for the· public good, without the prescription of the law ... is that which
is called prerogative."39 These postulates sound strangely modern to
students of contemporary administrative law with its "administrative
discretion," "policy making," "public convenience and necessity," and
similar phrases.
Thus Locke recognized three powers of government, one that makes
32 For an excellent, modem description of Locke and what he stood for see RussELL,
HISTORY 01' WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 617-40 (1945); CAIRNS, LEGAL PHILOSOPHY I'ROM
PLATO TO HEGEL 335-61 (1949).
•
33 2 Locx:s, Two TREATISES ol' GovERNMENT 144.
34 Ibid. and 141-42, 159.
35 Id. at 145-46.
36 Id. at 147.
37 Jbid.
38 Id. at 159.
39 Id. at 160.

A
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the laws,40 another one that carries them out, and a third one that
manages foreign and military affairs. The first should be separate from
the two others, but the latter should be headed by one and the same
organ-the king. Justice is still the king's justice, mitigated, however,
by natural law to which the king, too, is subject. 41 And he also exercises his royal prerogative whenever the law fails, or leaves him with a
wide discretion, in the interest of the public good.
Not long after Locke's Treatises the British judiciary attained the
degree of "indifference and forthrightness" that he had demanded. 42
The king was now confined to Locke's federative power a~d barred
from both lawmaking and law applying, at least insofar as the conduct
of military and foreign matters is not regarded as applying "law."43
These, then, were English theory and practice upon which Montesquieu founded his Spirit of Laws in 1748. "The oracle who is always
consulted" on the subject of separation of governmental powers "is the
celebrated Montesquieu."44 Like other oracles, however, Montesquieu
is a bit obscure.45 Chapter 6 of his Book XI contains the following
passages:
"In every government there are three sorts Gf power: the legislative; the executive in respect to things dependent on the law
of nations; and the executive in regard to matters that depend on
the civil law. . . . When the legislative and executive powers are ·
united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there
40 Meaning statutes. "The law," i.e., the old common law, to Locke is natural law to
be "found" by the judges. Both king and parliament are bound by it alike. Id. at 134-42.
Cf. the famous dispute between James I and Coke. SEAGLE, MEN OF LAw 177 (1947).
The idea that "the law" is fixed and settled, and bound the king even at the time when
he was the lawmaker, goes back to BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS (ca. 1258) I, 7, 5: lpse autem
rex non debet esse sub deo et sub lege, quia lex facit regem.-"Even the king, while not under
man, stands below God and the law, for it is the law that makes him king." See also Zane,
"The Five Ages of the Bench and Bar of England" in STUDYING LAw, Vanderbilt ed.,
41, 65 (1945).
41 Above, note 40.
42 Above, note 12.
4 3 It is not necessary to speculate on this point as to the fate of the king's prerogative.
As far as the power of filling so-called legal gaps is concerned, this has remained with the
judiciary; the king no longer creates equity. And his power to rule by decree in the absence
of Parliament declined and has finally disappeared since Elizabeth. 4 BLAcxsT. CoMM.
433. See also 1 id. 141, 237, 252, 334. "The king hath no prerogative but that which the
law allows him." Proclamation Case, 12 Co. Rep. 74 at 75 (1611); 6 HALSBURY, LAWS OF
ENGLAND, 2d ed., Hailsham, 378-81 (1931 ff.).
4 4 THE FEDERALIST, No. 47 (Madison). On the influence of Montesquieu in the
Colonies see SPURLIN, MoNTESQUIEU IN AMERICA 1760-1801 (1940). See also UHLER,
REvmw oF ADMINISTRATIVE Aars 1-29 (1942).
45 Um.ER, REvmw OF ADMINISTRATIVE Aars 5-7 (1942); Parker, "Judiciary and Executive Branch of Government," 9 THE JURIST 216-18 (1949).
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can be no liberty; because apprehensions may arise, lest the same
monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them
in a tyrannical manner. Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary
power be not separated from the legislative and executive. Were
it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject
would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge would be then
the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge
might behave with violence and oppression. There would be an
end of everythi_ng, were the same man or the same body, whether
of the nobles or of the people, to exercise those three powers, that
of enacting laws, that of executing the public resolutions, and of
trying the causes of individuals ...."
The judiciary power, according to Montesquieu, should be exercised
by a tribunal elected by the people, whereas the legislative is committed
to the hereditary nobility and the people (except "such as are in so
mean a situation as to be deemed to have no will of their own") respectively. The nobility should not be subject to the jurisdiction of the
ordinary courts but only of the upper house of the legislature, so that
noblemen be tried by their peers. And of the three powers, "the judiciary is in some measure next to nothing: there remain, therefore, only
two; and as these have need of a regulating power to moderate them,
the part of the legislative body composed of the nobility is extremely
proper for this purpose. . . . Were the executive power not to have a
right of restraining the encroachments of the legislative body, the latter
would become despotic; for as it might arrogate to itself what authority
it pleased, it would soon destroy all the other powers. But it is not
proper, on the other hand, that the legislative power should have a right
to stay the executive." Moreover, the executive power "ought to have a
share in the legislature by the power of rejecting; otherwise it would
soon be stripped of its prerogative. But should the legislative power
usurp a share of the executive, the latter would be equally undone."
The bearer of the executive power is the hereditary king.
Thus Montesquieu, much more conservative than Locke, suggested
that the aristocracy be a privileged class taking part in the legislature on
an equal foot with the commoners (from whom the propertyless are
excluded), moderating between king and legislature, and not being
subject to a judiciary other than that of their own upper house. As for
separation, he proposed that the three powers be separated from one
another in order to preserve what Montesquieu thought to be liberty;
that the judiciary power politically amounts to nothing; and that the
executive power consists in, or "depends on," international law-in this
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aspect identical with Locke's federative power-as well as in the absolute veto against legislative bills. Finally, we note the absence of the
practical Locke's prerogative power from Montesquieu's governmental
recipe. These pronouncements do not strike us as particularly radical,
but they were quite advanced in the kingdom of France of Montesquieu's time. We cannot indulge here in tracing the influence on the
Fathers46 of Montesquieu and of Blackstone who without quoting him
followed his ideas rather closely.47 One thing, however, remains certain: what was nearly radical for absolutist France and somewhat middle-of-the-road for England, whose king no longer exercised the veto
and whose courts judged commoners and noblemen alike, was certainly
a conservative political theory for the Colonies. It was so recognized as
early as 1778 by the French statesman T urgot in a letter critical of
American colonial constitutions,48 which he blamed for their "uncritical
imitation of the usages of England. Instead of bringing all the authorities into one, that of the nation, they are busy balancing these different
authorities. As if the same equilibrium of powers that has been thought
necessary to balance the enormous preponderance of the royalty could
be of any use in republics, founded upon the equality of all the citizens."49 It was against this letter that John Adams published in 1787
and 1788 his three-volume Defence of the Constitution of Government
of the United States of America, Against the Attack of M. Turgot in
His Letter to Dr. Price, Dated the 22nd Day of March, 1778.50
Despite such opposition, to which could be added names like
Thomas Paine,51 Benjamin Franklin,52 Patrick Henry5 3 and others,54
the doctrine was implicitly incorporated in the Federal Constitution
46SPUllLIN, MoNTBsQUIEU IN AMERICA 1760-1801 (1940).
471 BLACKST. COMM. 145-46, 268-69; SPUllLIN, MONTESQUIEU IN AMERICA 1760-1801,
29, 136 (1940).
48 Lettre de M. Turgot, Ministre d'etat en France, a M. le docteur Price (1784), also
reprinted in 5 O.BtJv.RE DE TtmcOT, Gustave Schelle ed., 532 (1923).
49 5 O.BUVRE D.B TtmGOT 534-35 (1923).
50 4-6 JoHN ADA.Ms, WoRKs, C. F. Adams ed., (1851-1865).
51 PAINE, THE RrcHTs OE' MAN ii, 4 (1792), "can perceive no more than two divisions
of power • • • that of legislating or enacting laws, and that of executing or administering
them.•.•"
52 Wright, "The Origins of the Separation of Powers in America," 13 EcoNOMICA
169-70 (1933).
58 Defending the exercise of the judicial power by the Virginia· legislature in a treason
case, he asserted that "the middle and lower ranks of people have not those illuminated
ideas which the well-born are so happily possessed of." 3 ELLIO'IT, THE D.BBAT.BS IN nm
SEVERAL CONVENTIONS, 2d ed., 66-67, 137, 140 (1896).
54 A very good legal-historic account of the separation doctrine in America has Sharp,
"The Classical American Doctrine of 'The Separation of Powers,'" 2 UNIV. Cm. L. RBv.
385 (1935).
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and expressly in many state constitutions. Yet one thing is certain: our
separation of powers theory and practice have in fact little in common
with Montesquieu's Spirit. Apart from such obvious differences as result from the absence of monarch and aristocracy in our Constitution
several very important distinctions present themselves readily.
First, Montesquieu's king is not subject to the "law," i.e., to court
control. The doctrine of judicial supremacy, of which the Continent
knows nothing to this day, is one of our most noteworthy British heritages. Only in recent decades have the courts exercised a degree of
self-restraint in applying judicial control at all times, even where strict
law-as distinguished from wide, discretionary law or ,policy-is involved. 55 Secondly, Montesquieu assigns to the king one distinct province of the government: international affairs. 56 We, on the other hand,
have not only vested the chief executive with military leadership and
the conduct of foreign affairs, but have also decreed that "he shall take
care that the laws be faithfully executed."57 Thirdly, whatever prerogative power we might concede to the courts or the President, it
cannot be based on Montesquieu, who is silent on this point. In other
words, Montesquieu speaks only of the courts, who are to execute domestic law, and the executive, who concerns himself with external
affairs. He is altogether silent on what we now customarily call executive branch of government, that is, those organs of state that execute
that part of domestic law not reserved for the judiciary.58 Perhaps this
part of governmental activity escaped Montesquieu's attention because
of its insignificance in his time;59 perhaps he neglected it because he
had not reached a satisfactory solution. Be this as it may, law and government in the United States developed in such a fashion as to render
just that part of legal administration highly important. The application
of Montesquieu's ideas to administrative law, as it actually turned out,
has proved to be an insoluble problem.. It might be desirable to segregate the country's military and foreign policy leader from other governmental work; but there appears to be no reason ,,.,,hy the faithful execution of-at times tightly knitted, narrowly applicable-domestic law
55 See below, note 68.
56 And the legislative

veto, not relevant here.
U.S. CoNST. Art. II, §3. See also Conwrn, THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE AND PoWERS,
3d ed. (1948); Grundstein, ''Presidential Powers, Administration and Administrative Law,''
18 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 285 (1950).
58 See our definition of "administrative law" above, at note I. For a distinction between
the powers of the President and that of the King of England see THE FEDERALIST, No. 69
(Hamilton).
59 Yet in Book XIII Montesquieu deals with the collection of taxes.
57
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should be essentially different and hence separate from similar tasks
performed by the courts.60 However, it took a long time until this was
realized. 61
It may not be inapposite to remind ourselves on this point that
Ivfontesquieu was a Continental European, who tried to suggest English institutions, as he saw, and misunderstood, them to the peoples of
the Continent, particularly France. There the conditions were less
complex. In France during the reigns of Louis XIII-XVI the royal power had become centralized and absolute ("l' etat c' est moi") until in 1789
her social system exploded like an overheated boiler. Absolutism ruled
most of Europe during the greater part of the 19th century, and Russia
until 1905 if not 1917. The courts of law in those countries enjoyed
de facto independence, it is true, but this was confined strictly to "court
matters." Many important fields were handled administratively, of
which deprivation of a man's liberty by confinement in the Bastille or
by "administrative" detention in Siberia are notorious examples. With
the dawn of liberalism, the lawmaking power was taken away from the
monarch, but as to the executive the picture remained unchanged.
Under the slogan of separation of powers it was maintained that none
of the three branches of government must interfere with the other: the
legislature makes the law, the courts decide criminal and civil matters,
and the executive, in tum, does whatever it may do under the constitution, e.g., detain or expel undesirable aliens, grant licenses, regulate traffic, etc. Here, then, in the absence of our judicial supremacy idea ( which
in theory at least curbs the executive whenever it interferes with life,
liberty or property) we have a true independence of judiciary and
executive from one another; but of course many Europeans have been
at loss to see ~hy this separation should be regarded as a safeguard of
liberty. 62 Totalitarian countries, although maintaining in fact a degree
60 " ••• court and agency are not to be regarded as wholly independent and umelated
instrumentalities of justice.•••" Justic,e Stone in United States v. Morgan, 307 U.S. 183
at 191, 59 S.Ct. 795 (1939), citing as a mistake that should not be repeated the history of
the struggle of equity for recognition as a system .of justice.
61 The idea that the "executive executes, and the judiciary construes the law," Wayman v. Southard, IO Wheat. (23 U.S.) l at 46 (1825), is not quite dead yet. Cf. Powell,
"Separation of Powers," 27 Pol. Sci. Q. 215 (1912), 28 ibid. 34 (1913). It is perpetuated
in the attempt to distinguish benveen administrative and e.,ecutive power, e.g., in Grundstein, "Presidential Powers, Administration and Administrative Law," 18 GEo. WASH. L.
REv. 285 (1950). And see below, at notes 75-77.
62 Consult PEASLEE, CONSTITUTIONS OF' NATIONS (1950). And see GOVERNMENTS
OF' CoNTINENTAL EunoPE, Shotwell ed. (1940); BucK AND 1v1AsLAND, THE GOVERNMENTS
OF' FoRErGN POWERS (1947); Friedrich, "Separation of Powers," 13 ENcYc. Soc. Ser. 663
at 665 (1934); UHLER, REvmw OF' ADMINISTRATIVE Acrs 8-18 (1942); MERKL, ALLGEMEINEs VERWALTUNGSRECHT (1927); KELSEN, Jusnz UND VERWALTUNG 8-10 (1928);
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of judicial independence, have rejected the separation idea as a political
postulate. 63

III
THE DocTRINE IN OuR T1ME

Summarizing the foregoing, we may say that the separation doctrine of this country is a composite of British practice as well as of
Locke's and Montesquieu's theory; to which have been added quite a
few new American elements. Our chief of state is taking care of military affairs, not without being limited by congressional laws; 64 and his
power to direct foreign affairs is restricted by the requirement that treaties be ratified by a qualified majority of the Senate as well as by budgetary provisions; etc. On the other hand, our chief executive is not
restricted to these functions, but he is. also obligated to see that "the
laws be faithfully executed." Any laws? No, only those "which are,
by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive,"6 ~ whereas
others are executed by the judiciary: But in exercising its functions, including the faithful execution of the laws, the executive branch
is subject to the control of the 'judiciary because under our separation
theory it is held that only the latter is authorized and capable of ultimately "deciding" what is and what is not lawful. 66 Here, however,
id., "Der Begrilf des Kompetenzkonfliktes nach geltendem oesterreichischem Recht," 57
JtIRISTISCHB BLABTI'llR 105 (1928); id., "Zum Begrilf des Kompetenzkonffiktes," 7 ZmTsCHRIFT PUER OEFFENTLICHBS RllcHT 583: (1928); id., ''La guarantie jurisdictionnelle de
la constitution," 45 REVUE DE DROIT PUBLIC ET DE LA SCIENCE POLITIQUE 197 (1928);
BERNATZIK, Dm OESTilRREICHISCHEN VERFASSUNGSGESETLE 433 (1911).
63 Fascist dictatorships, although having in fact both courts and other law-applying
agencies, reject the idea of truly separating them from each other as a sign of decay, of
lacking unity, and of a desire to "mechanize" the "life" of the state. OraMAR SPANN (one
of the founding fathers of fascist theory), Dm HAUPTTHBORIEN DER VoLXSWIRTSCHAPTsLEHBE, 19th ed., 22 (1929); JoNEs, Hi:sTORICAL lNrnoDUCTION To THB THl!ORY OF LAW
280, 283 (1940); PATON, A TEXTBOOK OF JumsPRUDENCE 130 (1946); Parker, "Judiciary
and Executive B_ranch of Government," 9 THI! JtIRIST 205 at 216 (1949). Soviet law,
in tum, holds the separation of powers to be a "bourgeois fiction" that, whenever opportune, will be abandoned to give way to open terror, force, and fascism. Tm! LAw OF THB
SovmT STATE, (Vyshinsky ed. 1938, Babb ~I. 1948). And see I Gsovsxr, SovmT
CIVIL LAW 202, 240 (1949); Hazard, above, note 12; Landheer, "The Universalistic
Theory of Society," in AN lNrnonuCTioN TO THB Hi:sTORY OF Soc10LOGY, Barnes ed., 385
(1948).
64 He cannot, as Montesquieu's king could, remove an army or navy officer without
cause, and the determination of the cause is not up to him but to a court martial with whose
decision he may interfere but to a limited degree. Cf. Articles of War 48, 49, 10 U.S.C.A.
§§1519, 1520.
65 Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch (5 U.S.) 137 at 170 (1803); Coates v. United
States, (8th Cir. 1950) 181 F. (2d) 816 at 818.
66Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. (23 U.S.) I at 46 (1825); Powell, "Separation
of Powers," 27 PoL. Sci. Q. 215 (1912), 28 id. 34 (1913); CoRwIN, CounT OVER
CONSTITUTION (1938).
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we encounter a remnant of the old royal prerogative. The faithful
execution of the laws often leaves a wide discretion. 67 In this case the
judiciary refrains from exercising control. To the "policy" and "political" questions68 have been added in recent years some that involve technical expertness.69
The above-outlined multicolored pattern is probably the reason that
we at times hear statements to the effect that "the President possesses
plenary and exclusive power as the sole organ of the Federal Government in the field of international affairs. That does not stem from any
act of Congress, nor is it a constitutional grant." 70 But if the President's
foreign policy authority71 stems neither from Congress nor the Consti67 This, however, is not necessarily characteristic of the administrative branch only.
Courts are often confronted not only with the intexpretation of words so vague that their
interpretation necessarily confers wide discretion, e.g., "cruel" conduct, "dangerous" weapons, "reasonable," "adequate," etc., but also with outright policy questions. See, e.g., the
policy discussions in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. (2 U.S.) 419 at 450, 451, 453-66, 569
(1793); Holmes, C. J., in Smith v. Postal Telegraph Cable Co., 174 Mass. 576, 55 N.E.
380 (1899); Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co., 113 Tenn. 331, 83 S.W.
658 (1904); Lord Dunedin in Sorrell v. Smith, [1925] A.C. 700 at 716 (H.L.); PATON,
A TEXTBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE 127-28 (1946); Simpson, "Fifty Years of American
Equity," 50 HAnv. L. RBv. 171 at 222-23 (1936); Parker, "Judiciary and Executive Branch
of Government," 9 THE JURIST 205 at 228-31 (1949).
68 Above, note IO. And see Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. (23 U.S.) 1 at 46
(1825); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. (30 U.S.) 1 (1831); Kentucky v. Dennison,
24 How. (65 U.S.) 66 at 103, 107 (1860); Mississippi v. Johnson, 4 Wall. (71 U.S.)
475 at 500-501 (1867); United States v. Coplon, (D.C. N.Y. 1950) 88 F. Supp. 915, 921.
See also Wade," 'Quasi-Judicial' and Its Background," 10 CAMB. L.J. 216 at 221-23 (1949).
Tocqueville's remark that "scarcely any political question arises in the United States that is
not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial question," I DE TocQUBVILLB, DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA, Bradley's ed., 280 (1948), must therefore be taken with a grain of salt. Cf.
Frankfurter, J., dissenting in American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 at
415-416, 70 S.Ct. 674 (1950), who confines Tocqueville's observation to "justiciable
issues."
69 SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 67 S.Ct. 1575 (1947), 62 HAnv. L. RBv.
478 (1949), 18 GEO. WASH. L. RBv. 492 (1940) (Commission to decide whether terms of
issuance of new stock were "fair and equitable" or "detrimental" to investors); NLRB v.
Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 64 S.Ct. 851 (1944) (Board to decide whether
newsboy is "employee"); Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489, 64 S.Ct. 239 (1943)
(Tax Court to decide whether a certain recovery was "income''); Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S.
402, 62 S.Ct. 326 (1941) (Bituminous Coal Division of Interior Department to decide
whether lessee of coal lands is "producer"); Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric
Co., 281 U.S. 464, 50 S.Ct. 389 (1930) (Commission to decide whether "public convenience, interest or necessity will be served" by granting broadcasting license to applicant).
But see Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275, 66 S.Ct. ll05 (1946);
Social Security Board v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358, 66 S.Ct. 237 (1946); Trust of Bingham
v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. 365, 65 S.Ct. 1232 (1945), and other cases, where the Court
indicates that it wishes to follow its administrative expert theory only where it substantially
agrees with the expert agency's holding. See also Federal Radio Commission v. Nelson
Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266, 53 S.Ct. 627 (1933).
70 Senator Wiley in 96 CoNG. RBc. 3263 (1950). Lord Coke-si parva licet componere
magnis-knew better. Above, note 43. And see below, note 72.
71 Quite apart from the Senator's astounding inaccuracy to speak of the President's
exclusive power in international affairs, as if there were no senatorial power of refusing to
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tution, what then does it derive from? Can there be any power or
authority not deriving from law? The .obvious answer is no. 72 What
speakers like the above-quoted may have in mind was the role of the
President as chief executive in the Montesquieu sense, involving broad
discretion-but yet law-as distinguished from his part as chief administrator of many well-defined, narrow domestic laws. Even the Supreme Court is not free from such misapprehensions. In the recent
Knauff case73 Mr. Justice Minton pro:J;?.Ounced that the "exclusion of
aliens is a fundamental act of sovereignty. The right to do so stems
not alone from legislative power but is inherent in the executive power
to control the foreign affairs of the nation." 74 Of course, by "inherent"
the learned judge meant "inherent in our constitutional system," which,
stripped of the unnecessary "inherent," simply means "under the Constitution." The statement does not appyar to serve any useful purpose,
for what the Court actually was doing was deciding upon the validity
of, and construing, an administrative regulation based upon a statute,
and it is obvious that without these laws the case would have been decided differently.
The diversity of presidential tasks has induced some writers to
establish a dichotomy between the President as head of the "executive"
power (foreign and military affairs, and "policy" making) and as head
of the "administrative" power (execution of law neither pertaining to
foreign and military affairs nor leaving wide discretion). 75 The usefulness of this partition is subject to severe doubt. 76 It is preferable to conceive the legal order as a unity, ultimately deriving from the Constitution, that vests certain organs of state with certain functions, at times
giving those organs wide, at times narrow, discretion. One of these organs is the President. All of his authority goes necessarily back to the
Constitution. Of course, his authority is not the same in every field,
ratify a treaty or to confirm a foreign affairs offi~ial's appointment, and no congressional
power to declare war or to grant or refuse appropriations!
72 Proclamation Case, above, note 43; 6 HALSBURY, LA.ws OF ENGLAND, 2d ed., Hailsham, 378-81 (1931 ff.); KELsEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAw AND STATE 144-153 and
throughout (1945).
73 United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 70 S.Ct. 309 (1950).
74 Ibid., citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 57 S.Ct.
216 (1936), and Fong Yue Ting v. United States; 149 U.S. 698, 13 S.Ct. 1016 (1893).
75 An excellent analysis of the problem has Grundstein, "Presidential Power, Administration and Administrative Law," 18 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 285 (1950). And see the literature cited therein, particularly Goodnow and Willoughby; CoRWIN, THE PRESIDENT:
OFFICE AND PoWERS, 3d ed., 82-205 (1948); WALDo, THE AmvuNISTRATIVE STATE 106
ff. (1948). But see CARROW, THE BACKGROUND OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 41 (1948): ''The
distinction between the terms 'executive' and 'administrative' has been and continues to be
far from clear."
76 CARROW, THE BACKGROUND OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 41 (1948).
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but this variation does not really justify the drawing of categorical
lines.77 Be this as it may, however, one point must not be overlooked.
The administrative, or executive, branch of the Federal Government as
it stands now is not to be conceived as a pyramidal hierarchy whose
apex is the President. Not only are there many agencies, vaguely referred to as "independent," over which the President exercises but little
control; but also is this true of many of the functions (particularly the
"quasi-judicial" ones) of the so-called old-line agencies which are thus
pro tanto "independent." The National Labor Relations Board or the
Federal Trade Commission prosecute charges of unfair practices entirely outside of the President's orbit, and the same is true of the Postmaster General's dealing with mail frauds or the Secretary of the T reasury's way of collecting revenue. These powers are based on the respective enabling statutes, which perchance may, but usually do not, provide
for presidential supervision.78
It would be interesting to trace the history of the development of
power separation through the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
In this study, however, we must confine ourselves largely to describing
the law as it stands at this time. In so doing, and in restricting ourselves
to administrative law, we shall investigate the extent to which the administrative-executive powers of the government have been successfully separated from the two _other ones. 79
A. Separation of Legislative From Administrative Matters
Early in our constitutional life the courts made it clear that "the
maker of the law may commit something to the discretion of the other
77 But see Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 at 628, 55 S.Ct. 869
(1935); CARRow, THE BACKGROUND oF ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 41-43 (1948).
78 E.g., the presidential final authority over licensing foreign air carriers. Civil Aeronautics Act §§801, 1006, 49 U.S.C.A. 401, 646; Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 68 S.Ct. 431 (1948).
79 The constitutions of the states often expressly provide for separation of powers, e.g.,
Arkansas, Art. IV, §§1, 2; California, Art. III, §1; Illinois, Art. III; Kentucky, §§27, 28;
Massachusetts, Pt. I, §30; Nebraska, Art. II; Virginia, Art. 3, §39. Actually, however, the
separation is frequently not carried through, as, for instance, where a county "judge" is in
charge of road repairs, which is a rather typical administrative function. E.g., Ark. Const.,
Art. VII, §28. See the survey in FRANKFURTER AND DAVISON, CAsEs AND OnmR MATERIALS ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 1149-50 (1932); CARRow, THE BACKGROUND oF ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 48 (1948). City governments, deriving their force from the state constitutions, know very little of power separation. Scroggins v. Kerr, (Ark. 1950) 228 S.W.
(2d) 995; Township of Marple v. Lynam, 151 Pa. Super. 288, 30 A. (2d) 208 (1943);
Southern Ry. Co. v. Danville, 175 Va. 300, 7 S.E. (2d) 896 (1940).AndseeStatev. Gutschte,
(Ark. 1950) 233 S.W. (2d) 446 at 448. The extent, if any, to which the states under the
Federal Constitution must adopt the separation idea is uncertain. Cf. Dreyer v. Illinois, 187
U.S. 71 at 84, 23 S.Ct. 28 (1902).
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departments and the precise boundary of this power is a subject into
which a court will not enter unnecessarily"80 and that Congress may
"certainly delegate to others powers which the legislature may rightfully exercise itself."81 At first, Congress did not avail itself of this permission to any important extent. The Brig Aurora case82 upheld a
statute that merely authorized the President to put into effect a statutorily predetermined embargo if he found that England or France violated
the neutral commerce of the United States. Nor did the Field case83 go
radically farther in that it permitted the President to suspend certain existing tariff provisions if he found that foreign countries imposed unequal and unreasonable duties on American products.
As time marched on, however, the growing necessity both of relieving the legislature from the burden of taking care of the details of
every law and of having specialized agencies adjust the law to ever
changing situations and needs has altered the picture both here and in
England. 84 By no means confined to the President,86 administrative
agencies have been authorized to an ever increasing degree to legislate,
as it were,86 within the framework of statutorily defined limits. Until,
as well as after, the New Deal cases of 193587 no such legislative dele80 Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat.
81 Id. at 42-43, in reference to the

(23 U.S.) I at 46 (1825).
making of procedural rules by the federal courts
under the Judiciary Act. It took about a hundred years until the Supreme Court found
itself ready to apply so broad a language to rule making by administrative agencies. Cf. J.
W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 48 S.Ct. 348 (1928). But see now
below, note 86.
82The Brig Aurora, 7 Cranch (II U.S.) 382 (1813).
83 Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 12 S.Ct. 495 (1892).
84Rep. Atty. Gen. Com. Ad. Proc. 7-21, 97-99 (1941); CoRWIN, THE PRESIDENT:
OFFICE AND POWERS, 3d ed., 151-160 (1948); CARR, DELEGATED LEGISLATION (1921);
REPORT oP THB LoRD CHANcELLoR's CoMMITTEE ON MrNrSTERs' POWERS 51-52 (1932);
ScawARn, LAw AND THB ExEcUTIVE IN BRITAIN 24-67 (1949).
85 United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 31 S.Ct. 480 (19ll); Union Bridge Co. v.
United States, 204 U.S. 364, 27 S.Ct. 367 (1907); Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470,
24 S.Ct. 349 (1904). See also United States v. Macdaniel, 7 Pet. (32 U.S.) I (1833).
86 Older cases denied that they were in fact upholding legislative delegation. Marshall
Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 12 S.Ct. 495 (1892); J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v.
United States, 276 U.S. 394, 48 S.Ct. 348 (1928). Modern opinions admit it without reluctance. Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126 at 142-143, 61 S.Ct. 524
(1941); Willapoint Oysters, Inc. v. Ewing, (9th Cir. 1949) 174 F. (2d) 676 at 686-87,
693, cert. den. 338 U.S. 860, 70 S.Ct. IOI (1949); Note, 130 A.L.R. 272, 273 (1941);
CARRow, BACKGROUND oP ADMINISTRATIVE LAw ll8-130 (1948).
87 So-called because of their immediate, destructive impact on the first "New Deal"
attempts to save the country from economic ruin. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S.
388, 55 S.Ct. 241 (1935); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 55 S.Ct.
837 (1935). Cf. Stern, "The Commerce Clause and the National Economy 1933-46," 59
HARv. L. REv. 645 ff. and 883 ff. (1946). And see CARRow, BACKGROUND OP ADMINISTRATIVE LAw ll8-l30 (1948). In 6 OP. ATrY. GEN. IO (1853), however, a code of criminal
and procedural rules for the Navy, consisting of 229 pages, was thought to be an invalid
exercise of legislative power, though the President had promulgated the code pursuant to his
constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief.
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gation was ever declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, and
it is not likely that the experience of the New Deal cases will repeat itself, not only because of the Court's changed attitude, but also because
delegating statutes are now drawn up with greater care than those involved in the New Deal cases.88
This congressional diligence, on the other hand, brings to our attention the truism that it would be wrong to state that nowadays any
kind of legislative delegation must be regarded as constitutionally valid.
A statute that would confine itself to saying, "The Attorney General is
hereby authorized to promulgate a criminal code" would no doubt be invalid for want of reasonable standards laid down by Congress. In other
words, it is still true-albeit with a wide degree of latitude-that the
legislature may make "a general provision" and give powers to those
who are to act under such general provisions merely to "-fill up tlie details."89 While it is "not necessary that Congress supply administrative
officials with a specific formula for their guidance. . . ,"00 it is yet mandatory that "Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible
principle" 01 which the agency is bound to follow. Between the two
extremes of either (as European constitutions do) giving agencies blanket authority to make law or of restricting it to such base details as the
fixing of the commencement or end of a statute's legal force lies what
is now considered permissible legislative delegation. A few examples
chosen at random may tend to show typical statutory limitations that
have satisfied the courts.92
Circumstances Under Which Agency's
Quasi-Legislative Power Was to
Become Effective.

Agency's Authority.

If England and France continued to
violate America's neutral commerce. 93

To revive an embargo act of Congress.
.(President)

If a prohibition to sell arms to the

To prohibit the export of arms to the
belligerent countries. (President)

belligerents in the Chaco conffict may
contribute to the restoration of peace.94

88 See, e.g., the catalogue of congressional policies and intentions upheld as justification
for price fixing by administrative agencies in Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 64
S.Ct. 660 (1944).
89 Chief Justice Marshall in Wayman v. Southard, IO Wheat. (23 U.S.) 1 at 43
(1825) (italics supplied).
90 Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742 at 785, 68 S.Ct. 1294 (1948), 1948 ANN.
Sunv. AM.. LAw 152-53.
9 1 Ibid. See also Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 68 S.Ct. 421 (1948).
92 Italics supplied in order to indicate relative vagueness.
93 The Brig Aurora, 7 Cranch (11 U.S.) 382 (1813).
94 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 57 S.Ct. 216 (1936).
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If it is in the interest of national defense. 95

·

If the United States is in danger of
invasion from foreign nations or Indian
tribes. 96
If necessary for the country's protection
against sabotage and espionage.97
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To prohibit the export of war supplies. (President)
To call forth the militia. (President)

To expel American citizens of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast, to
impose curfews upon them, etc. (President, Military Commanders)

If foreign countries impose "reciprocally unequal and unreasonable" custom duties on certain American
goods. 98
If the statutory custom duties do not
equalize our production costs with
those of foreign countries.99
If necessary for the protection and improvement of National Forests and to
secure favorable conditions of water
flow.100

To suspend statute permitting free import of certain goods. (President)

If an undue discrimination in railroad
rates is found to exist.101

To promulgate reasonable rates. (ICC)

If it is economically feasible without
substantially curtailing employment.102

To issue regulations providing for minimum wages. (Wage and Hour Administrator)

If necessary to stabilize prices, prevent
speculative, unwarranted and abnormal
increases in prices, rents, wages; to
eliminate hoarding, etc.; to protect consumers, wage earners~ investors, etc.103

To promulgate "fair" (or "equitable")
prices (so far as practicable at the level
of 1942), rents, wages. (Price Administrator, National War Labor Board)

To increase or decrease, up or down to
50%, the statutory custom duties.
(President)
To issue regulations concerning the occupancy and use of National Forests.
(President, Secretary of Agriculture)

95 United States v. Rosenberg, (2d Cir. 1945) 150 F. (2d) 788, cert. den. 326 U.S.
752, 66 S.Ct. 90 (1945).
96 Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. (25 U.S.) 19 (1827).
97 Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 63 S.Ct. 1375 (1943); Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 65 S.Ct. 193 (1944). But see Ex parte Mitsuye Endo, 323
U.S. 283, 65 S.Ct. 208 (1944); Rostow, "Our Worst Wartime Mistake," HARPER'S MAGAZINE, Sept. 1945, p. 193.
98 Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 12 S.Ct. 495 (1892). Actually, it
was unnecessary for the Court to go into the delegation question. Concurring opinion at 697 •.
99 J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 48 S.Ct. 348 (1928).
100 United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 31 S.Ct. 480 (1911).
101 Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342, 34 S.Ct. 833 (1914), 14 CoL. L. REv. 583
(1914); Wisconsin Rate Cases, 257 U.S. 563, 42 S.Ct. 232 (1922), 31 YALE L. J. 870
(1922).
102 Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126, 61 S.Ct. 524 (1941).
10a Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 64 S.Ct. 660 (1944); Bowles v. Willingham,
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If a federal loan and savings association
is conducting its business in an "unlawful, unauthorized, or unsafe manner"
or is unable with safety to continue in
business. 104
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To decree by regulation105 that the
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation be appointed receiver of
the association. (Federal Home Loan
Bank Administration)

The

comparative uncertainty of many of the typical standards listed
above is further enhanced by the fact that the executive charged with
carrying out the provisions making the regulations is the ultimate judge
as to whether the facts that give rise to the regulatory power do in fact
exist. In many instances this is so stated in the enabling statute itself.106
And even where the law does not say so either expressly or by strong
implication, the situation is nevertheless the same.107
From the foregoing examples it is clear, in any event, that it is not
exaggerated to say that the separation doctrine -amounts to form rather
than substance: there is no subject-matter that does not lend itself to
being delegated to administrative agencies for further elaboration, if
only Congress makes its policy and intention sufficiently clear. Thus,
for instance, a so-called political question may be legislative108 as well
as adrninistrative.109 Nor is the field of criminal-law making immune
from delegation to administrative authorities, if only the legislative
standards are sufficiently explicit.110 And the requirement of definite321 U.S. 503, 64 S.Ct. 641 (1944); O'Neal v. United States, (6th Cir. 1944) 140 F. (2d)
908, cert. den. 322 U.S. 729, 64 S.Ct. 945 (1944); National War Labor Board v. Montgomery Ward & Co., (D.C. Cir. 1944) 144 F. (2d) 528, cert. den. 323 U.S. 774, 65 S.Ct. 134
(1944).
104 Fahey v. Mallonee,
105 APA §2(c).

332 U.S. 245, 67 S.Ct. 1552 (1947).

106 "Whenever the President • • • shall find" would be the most outspoken expression
of this policy, as used, e.g., in the Hampton case, above, note 99. Other statutes, such as
the one underlying the Yakus case, above, note 103, while not using this language, make
it clear enough that the finding rests with the agency.
107 See already Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. (25 U.S.) 19 at 29 (1827), declaring the
President to be "the sole and exclusive judge whether the exigency has arisen" that justifies
the calling of the militia.
108 E.g., South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276, 70 S.Ct. 641 (1950); Colegrove v. Green, 328
U.S. 549, 66 S.Ct. 1198 (1946), 41 ILL. L. REv. 578 (1946).
100 E.g., United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 70 S.Ct. 309
(1950); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 57 S.Ct. 216 (1936);
Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 38 S.Ct. 309 (1918); United States v. Coplon, (D.C. N.Y. 1950) 88 F. Supp. 915.
110 United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 31 S.Ct. 480 (1911); M. Kraus & Bros.,
Inc. v. United States, 327 U.S. 614, 66 S.Ct. 705 (1946).
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ness of legislative standards is taken rather lightly where not criminal
punishment but rather administrative penalties, however severe, are
imposed. 111
That it depends on the law-rather than on constitutional_ pre-concept-whether a field is to be occupied by statute or regulation is now no
longer doubted even in the once storm-tossed realm of rate making. In
Munn v. Illinois1 12 the Supreme Court held that recourse for correction of rates established by a state legislature in industries "affected
with a public interest'' must be directed to the legislature and not to the
courts, since rate making was a legislative function. The powerful inHuence of Justice Field's dissent,113 however, was reHected in several
subsequent cases,114 which held that the question of the "reasonableness" of carrier rates is a question for judicial investigation, requiring
due process of law for its determination.115 However, "the tide had
started running back to Munn v. Illinois"116 at least by 1934 when New
York's right to have an administrative agency fix, and decide upon the
reasonableness of, milk prices was affirmed. 111 As matters now stand,
it is no longer doubted that rate making is validly done by administrative
regulation. 118 Inasmuch as this must be conceived as delegated legislation, rates could still be made by the legislature itself. But that is hardly
likely in the middle of the twentieth century. However, the Munn v.
Illinois doctrine, which rejected judicial review of legislature-made
rates,119 has not been revived on this point as far as regulation-made
rates are concerned. They are subject to court review although the
111 L. P. Steuart Bros., Inc. v. Bowles, 322 U.S. 398, 64 S.Ct. 1097 (1944). And see
Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, 339 U.S. 594, 70 S.Ct. 870 (1950) (administrative seizure as preliminary measure). For a lucid discussion of the distinction between (criminal)
"punishment" and mere "penalty" see GELLHORN, AD:MINISTRATIVE I.Aw 327-52 (1947);
Rosden, "The Legality of Suspension Orders Issued by the Federal Emergency Agencies,"
33 GEO. L.J. 45 (1945); KELsEN, GENERAL THEORY OF I.Aw AND STATE 278-79 (1945).
11294 U.S. 113 (1876).
11s Id. at 136.
114 Such as Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418, 10 S.Ct. 462
(1890); Reagan v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362, 14 S.Ct. 1047 (1894); St.
Louis & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Gill, 156 U.S. 649, 15 S.Ct. 484 (1895); Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S.
466, 18 S.Ct. 418 (1898).
115 Reagan v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co,; 154 U.S. 362 at 399, 14 S.Ct. 1047 (1894).
116 Justice Douglas, "Stare Decisis," 49 CoL. L. REv. 735 at 751 (1949).
117Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 54 S.Ct. 505 (1934).
11s Administrative Procedure Act §2(c); FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S.
575, 62 S.Ct. 736 (1942); FPC v. Hope Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 at 602, 64 S.Ct. 281
(1944).
119 Munn v. lliinois, 94 U.S. 113 at 134 (1876) (''For protection against abuses by
legislatures the people must resort to the polls, not to the courts").
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courts generally limit themselves to the inquiry whether the rate is confiscatory.120
B. Separation of Judicial From Administrative Matters

If we could state that there is no subject-matter that does not lend
itself to legislative delegation121 if only the proper form is observed, the
matter is not quite so simple in regard to the relation between judiciary
and executive. Here the courts have guarded jealously whatever rights
they could deduce for themselves from the Constitution. Moreover,
the judiciary, quite in accordance with British practice and Locke's
theory, has seen to it that they, rather than any other branch of the
government, are to decide what is within and what without the judiciary
province.122 This supreme attitude has produced two immediate results, as far as our subject is concerned: First, an all but universal128
judicial "control" of the administrative branch of the government,124
and secondly, although far less outspoken and to a large degree now
vanishing, the claim that certain categories of the law-apart from
judicial control or review of administrative acts-belong solely and primarily to the judiciary department, whereas others (often somehow not
conceived as "law") are excluded therefrom.
I. As to judicial review, not to be discussed here in detail, we
readily observe that modern administrative law has subjected the once
all-powerful judicial supremacy idea to significant restrictions. The
principle is now1 25 firmly entrenched that the party seeking it must
120 See the cases above, note 118. Of course, if perchance a rate would be enacted by
statute, the constitutional situation would be the same, inasmuch as statutes must not be
confiscatory either, although in fact the courts are reluctant to set statutes aside on economic
grounds. In any event, this problem is nowadays moot.
121 Constitutional matters could of course not be delegated because, apart from other
considerations, Congress alone cannot amend the Constitution.
122 Cf. below, notes 154, 157.
128 But see Frankfurter, J., in Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288 at 311, 64 S.Ct. 559
(1944) ("There is no such thing as a common law of judicial review in the federal courts").
124 Lee, ''The Origins of Judicial Control of Federal Executive Action," 36 GEo. L.J.
287 (1948). See also CoRWIN, CouRTS OVER CONSTITUTION (1938). The Administrative Procedure Act in §10 gives judicial review unless statutorily excluded or-more important-the matter is left to administrative discretion. Cf. below, at notes 128-133.
125 At least since Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 27 S.
Ct. 350 (1907); Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 58 S. Ct. 459
(1938); SEC v. Otis & Co., 338 U.S. 843, 70 S.Ct. 89 (1949). But see Ward v. Keenan,
3 N.J. 298, 70 A. (2d) 77 (1949), 25 N.Y.U.L. Q. REv. 401 (1950) (judge-made exception from rule in New Jersey); Anchor Casualty Co. v. Wolff, (5th Cir. 1950) 181 F. (2d)
741 at 743 (statutory exception in Texas); Note, 50 CoL. L. REv. 847 (1950) (discussion
of states' attitude toward exhaustion rule).
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first exhaust his administrative remedies. Coupled with this is the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction: where the law assigns tasks to an administrative agency the latter has primary jurisdiction to determine the
matter. Both doctrines are usually but not inevitably identical. Thus
an agency's jurisdiction may be concurrent with that of the courts, so
that the moving party is permitted to address himself to either.
If, however, the party chose the agency he must exhaust his remedies
there before he may apply to th·e courts for review. 126 The exhaustion
doctrine must be comprehended in connection with another powerful
principle of administrative law, the well-known substantial evidence
rule. Under it the courts uphold the agencies' fact findings if they are
supported by substantial evidence.127 It is clear that these two rules
coupled together give the agencies a preponderance of weight in administrative matters.
Another curtailment of the judicial review power springs from the
fact that it may be excluded by simple statute. The Administrative
Procedure Act in section IO makes it clear that judicial review exists
only in dubio: "Except so far as statutes preclude judicial review...."
It is true, however, that the importance of this exception is diminished
by the fact that it is the courts that decide whether or not the statute
is to be construed so_ as to exclude judicial review.128 Moreover, it is
up to the courts to say whether a given administrative procedure, though
not in itself subject to court review, must nevertheless conform with
126 For a distinction between exhaustion of remedies and primary jurisdiction see
United States v. Fritz Properties, (D.C. Cal. 1950) 89 F. Supp. 772. And see Northwestern
Public Service Co. v. Montana-Dakota Utilities Co., (8th Cir. 1950) 181 F. (2d) 19. Sec.
9 of the Interstate Commerce Act provides for an election between a complaint to the ICC
and a suit in court, but once the party has chosen the agency he must exhaust his remedies
before he may apply to the courts. United States v. ICC, 337 U.S. 426 at 437-38, 69 S.Ct.
1410 (1949), 63 H.mv. L. Rllv. 119 at 152 (1949), 59 YALE L.J. 770 (1950). See also
Schwartz, "Jurisdiction to Determine Jurisdiction in Federal Administrative Law,'' 38 GEo.
L.J. 368 (1950).
127 Stason, "'Substantial Evidence' in Administrative Law," 89 Umv. PA. L. Rllv.
1026-29 ( 1941 ), has a collection of many statutory provisions relating to the rule. For a recent,
more apparent than real change in the scope of the substantial evidence rule see Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, (U.S. 1951) 71 S.Ct. 456, NLRB v. Pittsburgh S.S. Co., (U.S.
1951) 71 S.Ct. 453. But see O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc., (U.S. 1951) 71 S.Ct.
470 at 472.
12s Cf. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 70 S.Ct. 445 (1950), 48 MrcH. L.
REv. 1127 (1950), 18 GEo. WASH. L. Rllv. 557 (1950), 38 CALIF. L.13.Ev. 326 (1950) (judicial review in deportation cases); AFL v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401, 60 S.Ct. 300 (1940) (no
judicial review of union certification as bargaining representative); Ohio Power Co. v. NLRB,
(6th Cir. 1947) 164 F. (2d) 275 (same under Taft-Hartley Act); Albrecht v. NLRB, (7th Cir.
1950) 181 F. (2d) 652 (1950) (judicial review of dismissal of unfair labor practice complaint). Herzog v. Parsons, (D.C. Cir. 1950) 181 F. (2d) 781 (no judicial review in similar
cases). And see below, note 129.
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the requirements of due process of law and whether these requirements
were met by the agency. In other words, an agency may hold that its
process was "due," or that no due process was required; but the court
to whom the aggrieved party appeals may yet decide that due process
was required and that none was afforded, and that therefore the procedure, although not ordinarily subject to judicial review, was unlawful.1 29
A yet farther reaching limitation of judicial review consists in the
exclusion of matters that are "by law committed to agency discretion,"130
which is mitigated, however, by permitting judicial review whenever
the agency lias abused its administrative discretion, i.e., whenever the
courts so find. This exception applies where "statutes are drawn in
such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply," as the
Senate Judiciary Committee Report on the Administrative Procedure
Act somewhat naively states.131 The "broad terms" referred to are
those where the interpretation of the pertinent statutory language is
more obviously up to the interpreter's personal views and approach than
usual. Where a statute makes the granting of a license dependent on
public necessity or convenience or rates on the requirement of reasonableness, it is of course patently untenable to say that the determination
of what is necessary or convenient is one that cannot be made by a
court. The courts have decided such and similar questions throughout
the ages. 132 But where the law does assign their determination to an administrative agency in the first place, any exercise of judicial review
would simply mean the supplanting of the agency's view and approach
by that of the court. This would render the agency useless. Thus the
courts refrain from exercising judicial control over agency discretion133
not without; however, reserving for themselves the role of final judge
over the issue whether a question is one of "law" or "administrative
discretion."
120 This was the line of thought in Eisler v. Clark, (D.C. D.C. 1948) 77 F. Supp. 610,
cert. den. 338 U.S. 327, 70 S.Ct. 160 (1949). And see Schwartz, "Jurisdiction to Determine
Jurisdiction in Federal Administrative Law," 38 GEo. L. J. 368 at 374-75 (1950).
180 APA §IO, first sentence. And see S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d sess. 212, 275,
368 (1946).
.
131 S. Doc., above, note 130, at 212.
182 See above, note 67.
1ss FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 60 S.Ct. 437 (1940); Federal
Radio Commission v. General Electric Co., 281 U.S. 464 at 466-70, 50 S.Ct. 389 (1930);
Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 at 722-25, 49 S.Ct. 499 (1929);
Butterworth v. United States ex rel. Hoe, 112 U.S. 50 at 60, 64 (1884). And see SEC v.
Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 67 S.Ct. 1575 and 1760 (1947), 62 HA:a.v. L. RBv. 478
(1949), 18 GEo. WASH. L. RBv. 492 (1950).
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Political questions, i.e., those that the courts hold to be political, are,
as we have seen, historically connected with and the predecessors of
modem administrative discretion. Here, too, the judiciary exercises no
control over administrative findings. 134
The knotty problem of these self-limitations, and the limitation of
the limitations, would need further elaboration in a treatise devoted to
judicial review. Suffice it here to note that it is the present trend to
widen rather than narrow the category "question of administrative discretion" at the expense of "question of law."135
2. As to the further question, what (apart from judicial review)
are administrative, what judicial matters, it does not seem to be possible
to give a general answer. Rather, the problem must be approached pragmatically from subject to subject.
At the very outset we are told that those matters are judicial that
are "cases" or "controversies" within the meaning of the Constitution.
While this limitation is not quite accurate-bankruptcy matters, for
instance, cannot well be classified as cases or controversies136-it does
amount to the general statement that the courts have jurisdiction only
over the traditional judicial matters.137 This in itself is a rather wide
concept that covers such affairs as litigations between private parties,
criminal procedures upon instigation of the government, inquisitory,
or one-party, matters like the admission or disbarment proceedings
against attorneys138 as well as functions that are indeed legislative, viz.,
the making of procedural rules. And the assertion that the courts entertain cases and controversies-that is, traditionally judicial mattersloses much of its significance in view of the both negative and formal interpretation the phrase "case or controversy" has been given by the
courts themselves.
a. First and above all, while the courts entertain only cases and
controversies, not everything that can be so classified is necessarily a
134 Above, notes
135 See Douglas,

10, 68.
J., concurring in United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S.
725, 70 S.Ct. 955, 971, 974 (1950); NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111,
64 S.Ct. 851 (1944).
136 Nor could probate and similar non-litigious matters.
137 Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 at 356-57, 31 S.Ct. 250 (1911); In re
Pacific Ry. Commission, 32 F. 241 at 255 (1887).
138 Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 2 S.Ct. 569 (1882); Randall v. Brigham, 7 Wall. (74
U.S.) 523 at 540 (1868); Opinion of the Justices, 279 Mass. 607, 180 N.E. 725, 81 A.L.R.
1059 (1932). But see In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 at 565, 65 S.Ct. 1307 (1945) (admission to the bar a non-judicial matter in Illinois). And see Parker, "Executive and Judiciary
Branch of Government," 9 THE JURIST 205 at 222-23 (1949).
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judicial matter. "Quasi-judicial" administrative agencies decide disputes that can be but termed judicial, such as claims for workmen's compensation or for refund of excessive freight, stockyard, or other public
utility rates. While there is usually judicial review (in the somewhat
diluted form in which it now exists)1 39 of administrative decisions adjudicating such disputes, yet the primary or at least concurrent jurisdiction goes to the administrative branch; and the matter must therefore be
classified as administrative. 140
b. While matters assigned to administrative discretion are excluded
from judicial review,141 it cannot be said that everything that involves
wide discretion is necessarily an administrative matter.142 Bluntly speaking, discretion exercised by agencies is administrative discretion, whereas discretion exercised by courts is judicial discretion. It is simply a matter of law and not of constitutional principle which of the two branches
of government, if any, shall have "discretion"143 in deciding a given
subject matter. Once, however, discretion is left to an agency, rather
than the courts, the latter will not disturb it.
This applies in particular to the so-called political questions. "Political," however, is a word of no precise meaning. It bears a reference to "politics" (statesmanship) as well as "politician" (statesman, person who devotes himself to politics),1 44 hence vaguely to the leaders of the state. But
the leaders cannot validly act without law so enabling them,145 which is
another way of saying that all state acts are legal acts. 146 Thus the most
we can say is that political questions are legal questions referring to
politics, a statement that does not amount to much. The Supreme Court
has treated the "political" questions as non-legal ones. The question, Who is the sovereign of a foreign country, is truly as capable of
determination under (international) law as the question of whether
139 Cf.

above, at notes 125-135.
THE BACKGROUND OF .Am.,nNISTRAnvB LAw 38-41 (1948); Brown, "Administrative Commissions and the Judicial Power," 19 Mnm. L. RBv. 261 (1935).
141 APA §10; above, at notes 130-133.
142 Cf. the examples above, note 67, which could be multiplied nearly ad infinitum.
143 "Discretion'' is here used in the sense of APA § 10, i.e., meaning "wide discretion." The transition from a so-called narrow legal question to one leaving wide discretion
(at times referred to as being "not one of law," cf. above, at note 131) is of course a mere
gradual one. KBLSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAw AND STATE 130 (1946); PATON, A TEXTBOOK 01' JURISPRUDENCE 128 (1946).
144 The word comes from the Greek n6;>..u;, city. Cf. no;>..m:ia, polity or constitution.
145 Cf. already Bracton and Coke above, notes 40, 43; Halsbury, above, note 43;
KsLSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAw AND STATE, throughout (1946).
146 KsLsEN, GENERAL THEORY oF LAw AND STATE 191-94, 359 (1946).
140 CA11Row,
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Oregon has a republican form of govemment1 47 or whether a state's
apportionment of congressional election districts is contrary to the
Constitution,1 48 under (domestic) law. Locke's ghost, however, seems
to have prevented the Supreme Court from deciding these and other
questions.149 But we must add that the courts actually do not decline
to decide all political questions where neither the legislative nor the
executive branch have jurisdiction to decide the question for themselves.
Whether or not a speech is seditious or whether an applicant for naturalization is attached to the principles of the Constitution, to mention only
two examples, are true political questions, yet the courts have never
hesitated to decide them, simply because under the law there was
neither Congress nor administrative agency to pre-empt the determination.150
c. The statement that courts entertain only cases and controversies
is a reference to form rather than substance. "If the question cannot be
brought into a court, then there is no case in law or equity, and no
jurisdiction is given" to the judiciary,1 51 which thus receives jurisdiction
only when any question_ assumes "such a form that the judicial power
is capable of acting on it. That power is capable of acting only when
the subject is submitted to it by a party who asserts his rights in the
form prescribed by law. It then becomes a case...."152 A citizen's demand that a road be repaired is not presented in the traditional judicial
form and hence may not be decided upon by a court, although it involves a question of fact (disrepair of a highway) upon which law
( whether the condition of the road is such as to make the pertinent
statute applicable) must be applied. A health officer has, but a court
147 Pacific Telephone Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 32 S.Ct. 224 (1912).
148 South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276, 70 S.Ct. 641 (1950); Colegrove v. Green,

328 U.S.
549, 66 S.Ct. 1198 (1946).
149 See also the cases above, note 68. Locke, however, treated political determinations
as a part of the federative power, that is, as belonging to the king, as chief executive, see
above, at notes 35-43; whereas in our system these "political" questions are handled both by
the administrative and executive branch of the government.
150 For border-case discussion see Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 59 S.Ct. 972
(1939), 28 GEo. L.J. 199 (1939), 8 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 975 (1940), 53 HARv. L. REv.
134 (1939), 17 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 122 (1939), 13 So. CAL. L. REv. 122 (1939), 24 MINN.
L. REv. 411 (1940); Field, "The Doctrine of Political Questions in the Federal Courts," 8
MINN. L. REv. 485 (1924); Dodd, "Judicially Non-Enforceable Provisions of Constitutions,".
80 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 54 (1931); Finkelstein, "Judicial Self-Limitation," 37 HARV. L. REv.
338 (1924); Finkelstein, "Further Notes on Judicial Self-Limitation," 39 HARv. L. REv.
221 (1925); Weston, "Political Questions," 38 HARv. L. REv. 296 (1925).
151 Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. (19 U.S.) 264 at 405 (1821); La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 423 at 455, 20 S.Ct. 168 (1899).
152 Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. (22 U.S.) 738 at 819 (1824).
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has not, power to "find," of his own motion, that an animal is dangerously diseased and to apply the law by killing it. On the other hand,
the very same questions of law and fact may be brought into court by
following the traditional two-party pattern. A party may sue the community or the officer for damages because of their negligence in failing
to repair the road or in killing the beast; and the aggrieved party might
bring about the desired results (repair, non-killing) directly by an injunction suit.153 Our reference, however, to the traditional judicial
forms does not necessarily mean that the courts will act only upon such
forms of action as existed at the time of the Fathers. The courts here
permitted development of judicial review action, although, at first, court
control was confined to either collateral attack of administrative acts or
to the so-called extraordinary writs, notably mandamus154 and later,
injunction and habeas corpus.155 At the end of the past century, however, the simple action or petition for judicial review came into being;156
and section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act has made it a
typical form of action in this field. 157
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The idea of administrative law as a legal discipline presupposes the
existence of administrative organs of state, i.e., of law appliers that are
neither the ordinary courts nor the legislator himself. A mere factual
division of labor, however, would not produce this result to the same
categorical extent as a constitutional "separation" of powers. As any
branch of any government can act only through law, the existence of an
1 53 See, e.g., North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306, 29 S.Ct.
101 (1908); Miller v. Horton, 152 Mass. 540, 26 N.E. 100 (1891); Warne v. Varley, 6
T.R. 443, 101 Eng. Rep. 639 (K.B. 1795).
1 54 Marbury v. Madison, l Cranch (5 U.S.) 137 (1803); Kendall v. United States
ex rel. Stokes, 12 Pet. (37 U.S.) 524 (1838). And see Lee, "The Origins of Judicial
Control of Federal Executive Action," 36 GEO. L.J. 287 (1948).
155 Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. (22 U.S.) 738 (1824) (injunction); Note, "The Freedom Writ-The Expanding Use of Federal Habeas Corpus," 61
HARv. L. REv. 657 (1948). And see REP. Am. GEN. CoM. An. PRoc. 80-82 (1941);
McFARLAND AND VANDERBILT, CAsEs AND MATERIALS ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 924-27
(1947).
156 Compare Federal Radio Commission v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289
U.S. 266, 53 S.Ct. 627 (1933), and Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric Co.,
281 U.S. 464, 50 S.Ct. 389 (1930), with United States v. Ritchie, 17 How. (58 U.S.)
525 at 533-34 (1855).
157 For a good survey of this development see Lee, ''The Origins of Judicial Control of
Federal Executive Action," 36 GEo. L.J. 287 at 299-300, 309 (1948). For the law under
the APA see Podovinnikoff v. Miller, (3d Cir. 1950) 179 F. (2d) 937; notes 64 HARv. L.
REv. 114 at 122-3 (1950), 62 HARv. L. REv. 1216 (1949).
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administrative branch means the existence of administrative law. Despite the fact that the United States and, to a lesser degree, England
were the first countries to translate the separation idea into practice,
administrative law was recognized as worthy of distinct treatment in the
Anglo-American law world later than in other countries, because here
the separation doctrine was strongly restricted by the idea of the rule
of law, or supremacy of the law, ·which was interpreted as synonymous
with supremacy of the judiciary. Under this theory, only the courts
may decide questions of law, whereas administrative agencies are here
only to "administer"; and inasmuch as this does entail the deciding of
legal and factual questions, these decisions were subject to court control and enforcement. Modern tendencies have considerably diminished
the force of the judicial supremacy idea.
Historically, separation of powers as well as judicial supremacy goes
back to the establishment of Parliament as the supreme maker of statutory law and to the independent status which English judges gained
around 1700. This made the king (the "chief executive") subject to the
law, as made by Parliament or as "found" by the courts. John Locke
cemented this state of affairs by proposing that in a good government
the legislative power should be separated from that of the king, whose
federative power is to consist in the main of two provinces: that of
taking care of foreign and military affairs and that of taking emergency
steps, when necessary, as well as such measures as cannot be predetermined by law but must be left, as we would say, to administrative discretion. (Locke's chief executive was also to be the head of the judiciary,
but this did not amount to much in view of the fact that king and
courts were regarded as subject to natural and common law.) Montesquieu, about sixty years later, expounded similar views, except that his
' judiciary should be separate from the other two powers and that his book
is not only politically more conservative than Locke but it lacks the latter's
practical clearness in general and the statesmanlike treatment of executive discretion in particular. His direct inB.uence on the Fathers, however, was as great if not greater than that of Locke. Yet our adoption
of the separation idea differs from Montesquieu in that we adhere to an
extent to judicial supremacy, from which B.ows our law of judicial rereview; that our chief of state conducts neither foreign nor military affairs entirely apart from the legislative and judicial branch; that he is
to execute the laws faithfully and has at times exercised the discretionary
prerogative of which Locke speaks. The diversity of presidential t~ks
as deriving from powers listed in the Constitution itself on the one hand
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?Ild those where he merely executes congressional laws on the other has
induced scholars of constitutional law, notably Goodnow and Willoughby, to differentiate between executive and administrative power.
This author, believing in the unity of the legal order and government,
has not found the differences between either source of power essential
enough to follow that dichotomy.
Separation of the executive, or administrative, from either legislative
or judicial branch of government is to an extent a matter of form rather
than substance. As far as legislation is concerned, there is no field of
law that, under the Constitution as it is read today, could not be assigned to the executive by simple legislation, if only certain standards
are complied with. The enabling statute must be sufficiently specific
so as to leave to the administrative agency-President or other-merely
the details to be filled in, as Chief Justice Marshall already recognized.
This requirement of specific detail has been considerably widened and
liberalized in recent years.
As to the judicial power, on the other hand, the courts have for a while
quite tenaciously clung to the idea of judicial supremacy. Time has diminished much but by no means all of it. Mitigated by the theories of exhaustion of administrative remedies, of primary administrative jurisdiction ( wherever it exists), and :finality of administrative fact findings if
supported by substantial evidence, the courts do exercise judicial control
over administrative decisions. This, however, may often be excluded or
diminished by simple statute, which is another way of saying that judicial
review is not necessarily recognized as a constitutional principle. (In fact,
however, statutory exclusion of judicial review is not frequent.) Judicial review is not exercis~d where a matter falls within what the
courts (somewhat akin to Locke) hold to be administrative discretion.
Nor do courts review decisions that they think to be of a "political" nature.
As far as original jurisdiction, as distinguished from mere review,
is concerned, the courts have never claimed to be vested with powers
other than those that involve typical court matters, that is (apart from
certain traditional exceptions such as bankruptcy), two-party litigations. It is thus not so much the contents, or substance, of a given
field of law that include or exclude it from cognizance in court but
rather the form in which the matter is attempted to be brought into
court. In other words, the question of whether a diseased animal is,
under the law, liable to be destroyed is a judicial or administrative one
depending on how the matter arises. Likewise are political questions
decided in court-despite occasional assertions to the contrary-as well
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as by agencies ( except that the courts will not entertain them on review
over an agency), and the same is true of matters involving wide discretion.
Thus it is perhaps inaccurate to speak of separation of powers as
a basic constitutional principle. All that is left of it seems to be an
expedient of governmental procedure.

